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This study aims to determine the comparison of debt ratio, company performance and value 
between companies with managerial ownership and non-managerial ownership companies. The 
method used in this research is descriptive method and different test using independent sample 
t- test tools. The number of samples in this study were 180 companies consisting of 14 companies 
with managerial ownership and 166 non-managerial ownership companies. The results show 
that the value of debt ratio (debt ratio), financial performance and the value of companies with 
managerial ownership are higher than non-managerial ownership companies. However, the 
results of hypothesis testing for significance value when tested with the independent sample t test 
method found that only the value of debt ratio or related debt ratio that there are significant 
differences between companies with managerial ownership when compared with non-
managerial ownership companies. For financial performance and firm value variables, it is 
found higher in companies with managerial ownership, but it was not found to be significantly 
different when compared to company performance and non-managerial ownership companies.   
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Introduction 
The purpose of the company is to maximize the wealth of the owner of the company.  Any 
implementation of activities within a company will be carried out on the basis of careful 
consideration and right so that the decisions taken are right and it will have a good impact on the 
company's value (Fama & French, 1998). 
Company owners have professional capabilities in managing a company but some are not. 
There are company owners who delegate company leadership to agents who are considered 
professionals in managing the company. This agent came to be known as managerial (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). It was further said that this managerial party would work to increase the value of 
the company or in other words maximize the wealth of the owner of the company (principal). For 
this managerial job to run well, the principal must pay a significant amount of money for this 
professional service. This fee is known as agency cost. 
The relationship between the principal and agent will be good if the agent works according 
to what is expected by the principal. However, there are risks that can occur if the managerial 
policies or decisions that benefit themselves and not in the interests of the shareholders. This 
conflict of interest then becomes the basis of agency theory. 





The behavior of the managers who own company stock will certainly be different from 
those who do not own company stock. If the manager owns shares of a company, then the trend of 
policies, decisions and behavior taken for the interests of the shareholders as well as for personal 
interests. However, if the manager does not own shares of a company, there is a possibility that the 
manager will act contrary to self-interest which is detrimental to shareholders (Christiawan & 
Tarigan, 2007). 
Several previous studies result that a strong relationship of the managerial ownership with 
the decisions that are related to business lead by managers. A research conducted by Maftukhah 
(2013) and Siregar and Yusdiana (2014) found that managerial ownership has a significant 
influence on a company's debt ratio. Related to firm value, some researchers found that managerial 
ownership has a relationship and influence on firm value (Sukirni, 2012; Kuswanto, 2006; Putra & 
Wirawati, 2013). Some of these results indicate that managers who own company shares will tend 
to make different business decisions when compared to managers who do not own shares. 
Behavior of managers is interesting to study since the results found in the previous studies 
revealed that managerial ownership has a relationship with various business decisions made by 
managers then there is a possibility of decisions related to debt ratio, company performance and 
company value can differ between managers who own shares with managers who do not own the 
company's shares.  Therefore, based on the discussion, the researcher is interested to examine 
descriptively as to whether there are differences in debt ratio, company performance and company 
value between companies with managerial ownership, which means managers own company shares 
compared to non-managerial companies or managers do not have share value in the company of a 
company. Furthermore, this difference make the differences test by independent sample t-test to 
indicated whether there are significant differences related to debt ratio, financial performance and 
company value when compared between companies with managerial ownership and non-
managerial companies. 
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
This research is based on agency theory where agents that are being appointed by the 
principal (shareholders) are required to do everything related to business decision to reach their 
goal to maximize their wealth of shareholders (Schroeder, Clark, & Cathey, 2001). However, there 
is a potential conflict of interest that can become a problem between the agent and the principal 
(shareholders), when the agents (managers) want to maximize personal profit which is contrary to 
the original goal that all goals are to maximize shareholder wealth. One reason why this conflict 
arises is because shareholders cannot fully control all decisions and activities made by managers 
so that it becomes an opportunity for managers to maximize their personal interests (Schroeder, 
Clark, & Cathey, 2001). 
Some researches have found that if a manager owns shares of a particular company, then 
the manager will tend to maximize shareholder wealth and this will also be in harmony with 
personal interests. Some business decisions and performance of companies related to managerial 
ownership can be seen in the following discussion: 
 
Managerial ownership and debt ratio 
Managers must have management capabilities in managing the company to maintain the 
survival of the company. Financial difficulties will lead to bankruptcy which will have an impact 
on the survival of the company (Meriani & Krisnadewi, 2012). One of the causes of company 





bankruptcy is due to the level of debt that is too high which is supported by poor management by 
managers so that the company cannot repay the debt. So managers must be really careful in deciding 
how much funding comes from debt. 
Maftukhah (2013) and Siregar and Yusdiana (2014) found that if a manager owned shares 
in a company, the manager's tendency would be be very careful in making decisions regarding debt 
ratio because the manager do not want financial difficulties which would ultimately harm the 
shareholders including the managers himself as he also own shares in the company. But there are 
also researchers who find that managerial ownership has no influence on the debt policies adopted 
by managers (Santoso, 2001; Yuniarti, 2013). Other researchers have also conducted research that 
has a link between managerial ownership and debt ratio.  (Larasati, 2011; Meriani & Krisnadewi, 
2012; Maftukhah, 2013; Santoso, 2001; Siregar & Yusdiana, 2014; Yuniarti, 2013). 
 
Managerial ownership and company performance 
One measure to indicated the company's performance is net income. Net income is the 
difference between income and expenses. The greater profit indicates the higher level of 
profitability. According to Christiawan and Tarigan (2007) the company's performance will be 
better if the company's shares are owned by the manager because the manager no longer acts as a 
paid professional but also as the owner of the company. From the profits generated, it will 
determine how much dividend will be distributed to shareholders. Managers who own shares will 
enjoy this dividend distribution. The other researchers who examined managerial ownership related 
to financial performance are studies that have been conducted by (Lestari, 2019; Hidayat & 
Firmansyah, 2017). 
 
Managerial Ownership and Company Value 
The value of the company in this study was measured using the company's market value 
divided by total assets. A higher score indicates a higher company value, which means how many 
times the market has valued the company compared to the value of the company's assets. 
Companies whose managers own shares in a logical company will increase the value of the 
company because if the value of the company rises then it will increase profits in the form of wealth 
to him as a manager who is also a shareholder. Several researchers have previously conducted 
research related to managerial ownership with company value including research conducted by 
Kuswanto (2006) and Sukirni (2012) which found there was a significant negative effect between 
managerial ownership and firm value. Unlike the case with Sumanti and Mangantar (2015), 
Sumanti and Sukirni (2017) that managerial ownership did not have a significant effect on firm 
value. Whereas Putra and Wirawati (2013) found that managerial ownership strengthens the 
relationship between performance and firm value. 
 
Research methods 
This research aims to see a descriptive comparison related to debt ratio, financial 
performance, and company value between companies with managerial ownership and managerial 
non-ownership companies.  It also will be analyzed by using the independent sample t test different 
test to see whether there are significant differences related to the three variables, namely debt ratio, 
financial performance, and the value of the company in companies with managerial ownership 





compared to non-managerial ownership companies. This research period is from 2013-2017. The 
sample selection is done by purposive sampling method in which several criteria are determined, 
among others: companies that are consistently registered in the study period, and companies that 
have complete data related to financial variables in this study. The total sample is 180 companies 
consisting of 14 companies with managerial ownership and 166 non-managerial ownership 
companies. The financial data variables in this study can be seen in the following table: 
Debt ratio is measured using a debt ratio obtained from total long-term debt divided by total 
long-term debt plus company equity. The financial performance in this study uses ROA obtained 
by net income divided by the average total assets of the year t with the previous year. Whereas the 
variable value of the company show from the market perception is indicate from the value of shares 
obtained from the volume of stock trading multiplied by the price of shares [hereinafter divided by 
the total assets of the company]. For managerial ownership category, it show from the ownership 
statement if the manager in the company has company shares, then it is categorized as a company 
with managerial ownership, while companies whose managers do not have company shares will be 
categorized as non- managerial ownership companies. 
The first step in the data processing procedure in this study is to group and separate data, 
namely groups of companies with managerial ownership (µ1) and non-managerial ownership 
companies (µ2). Furthermore, the value of the debt ratio variable, financial performance, and 
company value will make the differences test to see whether there is a significant difference 
between the group of companies with managerial ownership and non-managerial ownership group 
of companies. The statistical formula in this study is: 
H0  : µ1 = µ2 
Ha : µ1 ≠ µ2 
Hypothesis testing using t-test with two independent sample (independent sample t- test). With a 
significance level (sig) of 5%. The decision to accept H0 is made if the value is significant> 0.05 
and vice versa rejects H0 if the value is significant ≤ 0.05 (Santoso, 2001). 
 
Results and Discussion 
From the 180 companies that were sampled in this study, 14 companies were companies 
with managerial ownership and 166 companies were non-managerial ownership companies. This 
research was conducted in the 2013-2017 research period. Description of research data related to 
debt ratio, company performance (ROA) and company value can be seen in table 1 below: 
 
Table 1 
Statistic Descriptive Data 
 







Yes 14 0.38 0.23 0.06 
No 166 0.24 0.32 0.25 
ROA 
Yes 14 0.01 0.05 0.01 
No 166 -0.07 2.95 0.23 
Value 
Yes 14 84,695.07 228,345.66 61,027.95 
No 166 37,150.76 210,755.16 16,357.77 





The average value of the debt ratio for companies with managerial ownership and with non-
managerial ownership company, show that a percentage of 38% and 24%, with the source of funds 
from creditors. Both debt portion sizes are still far from a deficit condition because the value of the 
debt ratio is still far below the value 1. For company performance measured by ROA found to be 
higher in companies with managerial ownership compared to non-managerial ownership. 
Nevertheless, the companies of both groups with managerial ownership and non-managerial 
ownership both have poor financial performance. If seen from the value of the company measured 
by market perceptions related to the value of shares, the company with managerial ownership has 
a higher company value compared to the non-managerial ownership company. 
From table 1 it can be seen that the average debt ratio, ROA and Value of companies with 
managerial ownership are higher than those of companies that do not have managerial ownership. 
But whether there are significant differences related to debt ratio, company performance and 
company value between companies with managerial ownership and companies without managerial 
ownership can be seen in table 2 below: 
 
Table 2 




























From the significance value of the hypothesis test results in table 2, it can be seen that only 
the debt ratio variable has a significant difference between groups of companies that have 
managerial ownership when compared to non-managerial ownership companies. Although 
financial performance (ROA) and the value of companies with managerial ownership are higher 
than companies with non-managerial ownership, the results of hypothesis testing prove that there 
are no significant differences for these two variables when compared between companies with 
managerial ownership and non-managerial ownership companies. 
From the results of the first hypothesis test, it can be seen that managers in companies with 
managerial ownership are braver to take risks compared to managers in managerial non-ownership 
companies who appear to be more careful in taking policies related to debt. This study is different 
from the research made by Chistiawan and Tarigan (2007) where although the differences in debt 
ratio were found to be significant differences, the level of debt ratio in companies with managerial 
ownership is much smaller than the debt ratio of companies with non-managerial ownership. 
Several references related to managerial ownership and debt policy have been studied previously 
where they found a relationship between managerial ownership and debt ratio. These studies 
include research conducted by (Larasati, 2011; Meriani & Krisnadewi, 2012; Maftukhah, 2013; 
Santoso, 2001; Siregar & Yusdiana, 2014; Yuniarti, 2013). 
 





For financial performance variables (ROA) and firm value, no significant difference is 
found, meaning that companies with managerial ownership and managerial non-ownership 
companies have average financial performance and firm value that are almost the same even though 
in the descriptive data in the table. 1 shows companies with managerial ownership have higher 
financial performance and firm value compared to companies with non-managerial ownership. This 
proves that managers as well as shareholders when increasing company performance and company 
value, the value of their wealth as individuals will also increase so that companies with managerial 
ownership will definitely try to improve financial performance and company value because it will 
have an impact on the manager's own wealth. Several studies that found a link between managerial 
ownership and financial performance had previously been studied by (Christiawan & Tarigan, 
2007; Lestari, 2019; Hidayat & Firmansyah, 2017). Whereas researchers who have conducted 
research on managerial ownership with firm values include those conducted by (Sukirni, 2012; 
Sumanti & Mangantar, 2015; Kuswanto, 2006; Putra & Wirawati, 2013; Dewi & Sanica, 2017; 
Nurkhin, Wahyudin, & Fajriah, 2017; Putra & Wirawati, 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
From the results of existing studies it is proven that descriptively debt ratio, financial performance 
and the value of companies with managerial ownership are higher than non-managerial ownership 
companies. However, from the results of the statistics test only debt policy variables were found to 
have significant differences between companies with managerial ownership when compared to 
companies with non-managerial ownership. Companies with managerial ownership have a level of 
courage in carrying out debt policies from creditors compared to non-managerial ownership 
companies that are more careful in conducting debt policies. For the next researcher, it is 
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